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I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcasting industry is rapidly entering the era of digitization,
distributed intelligence, and interactivity. Despite lingering standardization
issues, digital transmission is replacing analog transmission in the three
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major delivery platforms (terrestrial, cable, and Direct Broadcast Satellite
[“DBS”]). Programmable user terminals built upon personal computer
hardware and software technology are replacing “dumb” analog television
sets. More importantly, after several failed attempts, interactive television
(“ITV”) services are finally poised for large-scale deployment. This
transition opens many exciting opportunities for businesses and users,
ranging from television-based electronic commerce (known as “tcommerce”) to interactive educational programming. These new
applications will evolve as broadcasters, software vendors, equipment
makers, and users experiment with novel ways to enhance and perhaps
transform the television experience altogether.
These changes, however, have also raised several questions about
who will shape the architecture of these emerging broadcasting networks,
and hence determine business models, communication patterns, and the
dynamics of technological innovation for the next generation of television.
Will programmers or network operators alone decide which interactive
services will be made available to users? Will electronic marketplaces
1
develop as open transactional spaces or “walled gardens”? Will users be
able to connect new terminal equipment to the network and experiment
with new network uses such as peer-to-peer applications? As they address
these questions, policymakers face several pressing concerns. Who will
create incentives for firms to invest in this infant marketplace and at the
same time protect competition in services and applications, foster
decentralized innovation, and secure users’ access to a wide range of
information and transaction services? Would ex ante regulation squelch the
success of a sector that, after many failed attempts, now appears ready for
prime time? What regulatory principles and tools should be used to
confront the questions raised by ITV?
Far from hypothetical, these questions have already surfaced in
several high-profile cases, in particular the merger of America Online
(“AOL”) and Time Warner, which combined the world’s largest Internet
Service Provider (“ISP”) and early entrant in the ITV market with the
United States’s second-largest cable operator and major worldwide
programmer. In reviewing the merger, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) found that
the combination of distribution facilities, service operations, and content

1. “Walled garden” refers to a network architecture which prevents users from
accessing content or services provided by parties unaffiliated with the network operator. See
Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive TV Services Over Cable, Comments of
Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America and The Center for Media Education,
CS Dkt. No. 01-7, at 5-6 (Mar. 19, 2001), at http://www.cme.org/access/press/Itvfin.pdf.
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held by AOL/Time Warner raised competition concerns in three markets:
broadband Internet access service, broadband Internet transport service,
and ITV. While regulators imposed several merger conditions relating to
broadband Internet access and transport services, those relating to ITV
were, in comparison, rather minor.
In this paper we analyze the development of ITV in the United States
and Western Europe and the policy debates that have accompanied it. We
argue that despite the nascent character of the market, there are important
regulatory issues at stake that will determine the future architecture of this
new information distribution platform. In most local markets, cable
operators function as monopolies. There is evidence that even in markets
where competition exists, it does not significantly affect cable operators or
2
the rates they charge.
Absent rules that provide for non-discriminatory access to network
components and a degree of standardization for terminal equipment, these
platform operators will have strong incentives to leverage their ownership
of delivery infrastructure into market power over ITV services and content.
While in the short term, integration between platform operator, service
provider, and terminal vendor is likely to facilitate the introduction of
services, the lasting result could be a collection of fragmented “walled
gardens” offering only the content and applications approved by the
infrastructure incumbent. If ITV develops under such a model, the exciting
opportunities for broad-based innovation and widespread access to multiple
information, entertainment, and educational services in the next generation
of television may never materialize.
We recognize that given the incipient nature of the market,
particularly in the United States, it would be premature for regulators to
attempt to implement detailed industry-wide rules for ITV platforms and
services. There is simply too much uncertainty about which services users
will want and at what price, how the technology will evolve, and what
business models will emerge. It could be argued that platform owners will
have incentives to open their networks in order to stimulate the
proliferation of content and services upon which they could levy a
3
distribution fee. The dynamics of market competition would then stimulate
a migration from proprietary technologies and “walled garden” business

2. See generally Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable TV Consumer Prot. and
Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 22756, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
977 (1997), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-0207A1.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
3. See generally James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A
Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000).
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models to open standards and interconnected networks, thus making
regulatory safeguards less necessary. Experience to date with the
development of ITV, however, is not encouraging in this regard. We
contend that it is not too early to establish general rules and first principles
against which market developments can be monitored. ITV provides
another instance where digital convergence calls for adaptation of existing
broadcasting and telecommunications policies to balance industry
development with the economic and social benefits associated with open
network access. The debate over broadband cable Internet offered a first
4
approach to the problem and some important lessons. While technologies
may vary from case to case, ultimate policy goals should not.
The case of ITV offers an opportunity to investigate how desirable
policy goals—among them competition, broad-based innovation, and
widespread access to information “from diverse and antagonistic
5
sources” —should be implemented in the post-convergence environment.
In this Article we first review the evolution of the broadcasting industry
6
through three successive models: the traditional “Fordist” television
model, the current multichannel television model, and the emerging ITV
model. Second, we characterize the basic components of ITV and explore
the concerns raised by the evolution of multichannel video programming
distributors (“MVPDs”) into ITV platform operators. Our conclusion is that
dominant MVPDs are likely to have the ability and the incentive to
leverage control over the transmission infrastructure into the ITV
applications environment, engineering market outcomes in favor of
affiliated programmers, electronic retailers, and ITV service providers. We
note that, in contrast to the case of broadband cable Internet, the policy
concerns go beyond infrastructure access control and include in particular
the use of proprietary terminal equipment technology. Third, we review
how regulators in the United States and the European Union (“EU”) have
so far responded to these concerns by contrasting two prominent cases: the
AOL/Time Warner merger and British Interactive Broadcasting joint
venture. We conclude that the wait-and-see approach taken by American
regulators risks tolerating the deployment of a network architecture that

4. See generally François Bar et al., Access and Innovation Policy for the ThirdGeneration Internet, 24 TELECOMM. POL’Y 489 (2000) (arguing that the success of the
Internet in the United States fundamentally rests on FCC policies aimed at maintaining
network openness by making key network components available to all on cost-oriented
terms).
5. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
6. The term “Fordism” is used to describe the particular system of production and
consumption that emerged during the earlier part of the twentieth century. See MICHAEL J.
PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984).
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could restrict competition in ITV services, hamper innovation, and leave
second-class digital economy citizens with access to a limited array of
entertainment, transaction, and educational services. We also note that the
imposition of limited open-access requirements in the United Kingdom
(“UK”) market has hardly hampered investments in ITV. Finally, we
outline a general framework for regulatory thinking about open network
access that reflects the convergence of communications industry sectors
and the need to integrate seemingly conflicting policy goals.

II. THE THREE GENERATIONS OF BROADCASTING
The broadcasting industry has developed through three technological
generations—each characterized by different types of services, business
models, control strategies, and regulatory environments—as shown in
7
Table 1. It is interesting to note that each new generation has not
thoroughly replaced the pre-existing industry structure, but rather added a
layer of complexity to it. From the start of commercial broadcasting in the
post-war period to about the mid-1970s, television consisted essentially of
one-way terrestrial broadcasting of a limited number of channels that each
aggregated and sold large audiences to advertisers. Their operators were
protected by rules that restricted competition both within the industry and
from new entrants. The regulatory model was based on the idea that
broadcasters (both public and private) are trustees of a public resource (the
radio spectrum) and thus under obligation to serve the public interest as
defined by the government. While government protection from competition
ensured the profitability of most broadcasting operations, fulfillment of
8
public interest obligations was, at best, questionable.
During the 1970s, a series of technological and regulatory
developments created the conditions for the rapid growth of cable, and later
DBS These new platforms essentially offered more of the same service:
one-way delivery of branded packages of television programming. A new
business model emerged, however, based on the collection of payments
directly from subscribers, spawning the growth of specialized channels
9
with a limited audience base. The regulatory model was fashioned as a mix
of traditional broadcasting and utility regulation. Cable operators were for
the most part granted monopolistic franchises by local authorities in return

7. See infra p. 67. See Eli M. Noam, Towards the Third Revolution of Television (Dec.
1, 1995) (symposium presentation, available at http://www.columbia.edu/dlc/wp/citi/
citinoam18.html).
8. ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM: THE DEREGULATION
OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1989).
9. BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO TELEVISION 3 (1999).
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for payments and limited access obligations (the so-called PEG, or Public,
Education and Government channels, and leased access channels). The
federal government later imposed restrictions on cable operators’ editorial
control by limiting the number of channels that can be occupied by
10
affiliated video programmers. Notwithstanding these obligations, cable
essentially developed as a closed network with tight integration between
network layers (transmission infrastructure, service provision, and terminal
equipment).
The regulatory model for the second generation of broadcasting thus
evolved in remarkable contrast with that of the telecommunications
network, particularly after the FCC, starting in the late 1960s, progressively
forced open the monopoly phone network by encouraging open attachment
11
12
of terminal devices, network interconnection, and third-party access to
13
unbundled network elements. As a result of the implementation of these
rules, over the last three decades the telecommunications industry has
experienced a period of unprecedented innovation based on
experimentation by network users and third-party service providers. In
comparison, innovation and the introduction of new services in the cable
industry has been limited, reflecting only the resources and the narrow
14
economic incentives of those in control of the transmission infrastructure.

10. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 11, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
11. See generally Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision,
13 F.C.C.2d 420, 13 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 597 (1968) (establishing that the Carterfone
terminal equipment created no harm to the AT&T network).
12. See generally Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of
Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Public Point-toPoint Microwave Radio Serv. and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the
Comm’n’s Rules, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 22 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1501
(1971) (ruling that AT&T would have to make its local telephone exchanges available to
new entrants under reasonable terms).
13. See generally Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common
Carrier Servs. and Facilities, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 38 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)
141 (1976) (requiring AT&T to make the Bell System network and services available to its
competitors on an unbundled basis).
14. In fact, there have been notable failures in the introduction of new services by cable
operators, such as Qube, an interactive cable service launched by Warner Amex Cable and
available in the early 1980s, and more recently Full Service Network, announced by Time
Warner in the early 1990s. How Blind Alleys Led Old Media to New, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2000, at C1; see also Press Release, VR1 Entertainment, VR1 Signs Agreement with Time
Warner Cable’s Full Service Network (Feb. 26, 1996) available at
http://www.vr1.com/press_releases/full_pr/1996/022696_fsn.html.
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Table 1. The Three Generations of Broadcasting
1st Generation:
2nd Generation:
Fordist
Multichannel
Television
Television

3rd Generation:
ITV

Service

One-way
broadcasting of
few video
channels

One-way
broadcasting of
multiple video
channels

Two-way
delivery of
multiple video
channels and
other services

Business
Model

Mass advertising
and/or license
fees

Mass
advertising,
license fees, and
subscriptions

Targeted
advertising,
subscriptions,
and
transaction fees

Control
Strategies

Property rights
over spectrum
license

Integration of
distribution and
content assets

Access control
and proprietary
standards

Regulatory
Model

Public trustee
(incumbent
protection)

Mix of public
trustee and
limited utility
regulation

* Yet to be
defined

After much delay, the revolution in digital processing and
transmission of information is finally ushering the broadcasting industry
into a new era. As a long-time industry analyst described it, “[a]fter a halfcentury of glacial creep, television technology has begun to change at the
15
same dizzying pace as the wares of Silicon Valley.” But as MVPDs
evolve from distributors of video programming into operators of a network
that supports a variety of information services, regulators are confronted
with a fundamental policy question: Under what regulatory model should
the next generation of television services develop? Should we use the
model of the second generation of broadcasting—even though cable and
satellite operators may effectively act as providers of telecommunications
infrastructure rather than as content aggregators and distributors—or that of
open network access that has guided much telecommunications policy over
the last decades? This question was an important thread of the debate
15. OWEN, supra note 9, at 3.
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16

leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and continues to run
through current policy discussions. So far, however, television and
telecommunications continue to be regulated under separate regimes.

III. WHAT IS ITV?
Due to the infancy of the market, any description of what constitutes
ITV is necessarily a working definition. In the context of this article, we
follow the definition proposed by the British broadcasting regulator,
Independent Television Commission (“ITC”): ITV services are “pull”
services initiated by the subscriber to a MVPD that are not necessarily
17
related to any specific video programming. This definition allows for an
understanding of ITV that goes beyond a simple extension of current
television. In fact, we differentiate between two types of ITV services:
program-related and dedicated. The first type of service constitutes
relatively straightforward extensions of current television, while the second
type of service offers modes of interaction that are fundamentally new.
Program-related services refer to ITV services that are directly related
to one or more video programming streams. They enhance and extend the
broadcaster’s core business. For example, these services allow users to
obtain additional data related to the content (either programming or
advertising) to select from a menu of video feeds, to play or bet along with
a show or sports event, to interact with other viewers of the same program,
or to initiate transactions of goods or services featured in the video
programming. In this case, ITV enhancements (such as Advanced
18
Television Enhancement Forum [“ATVEF”] “triggers”) are overlaid onto
the Moving Pictures Expert Group (“MPEG”) video programming stream.
These enhancements, when selected, direct viewers to content stored either
in the set-top box or on a remote server. In the latter case, the enhanced
content is delivered either through the same video pipeline or through a
separate transmission line (e.g., an Internet connection). Examples of
services already available or in the deployment stage are: the delivery of
on-demand financial information and stock quotes, along with a business
news channel; enhanced television commercials that allow viewers to
request more information about the product; enhanced educational

16. See generally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE (1997).
17. See Independent Television Commission, Interactive Television: An ITC Public
Consultation (2000) (on file with Journal).
18. ATVEF is a cross-industry group formed by programmers, broadcasters, ITV
service providers, hardware makers, and software developers intended to create standard
protocols for the delivery of ITV enhancements. Advanced Television Enhancement Forum
at http://www.atvef.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
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programming; and services that allow users to play or bet along with quiz
shows, reality shows, and live sports events.
In the case of program-related services, the programmer or advertiser
will typically contract with an ITV service provider for the creation of
programming enhancements, storage of interactive content, and
management of return channel data. Nevertheless, the agreement of the
network operator is still needed to deliver the downstream program
enhancements, to allow compatibility between ITV applications and
operator-provided customer equipment (unless a stand-alone box is used,
which is unlikely for reasons discussed below), and possibly to provide the
high-speed return path needed for certain applications. The ability of
programmers and ITV service providers to experiment with and to deploy
services is, therefore, de facto dependent on access to both the transmission
infrastructure and the home terminal functions. As we argue in the next
Section, unless regulatory safeguards guarantee such access on
nondiscriminatory terms, the network operators will, as in the past, control
the terms of innovation for the next generation of broadcasting services.
By contrast, dedicated services are independent from any specific
programming stream. Typically, these will be entertainment, information,
and transaction services provided by electronic retailers on the basis of
contracts with the MVPD, which essentially acts as a platform operator,
offering third parties a “window” for t-commerce. Examples of these
services already available or in the deployment stage are electronic
programming guides (“EPGs”), video-on-demand, e-mail, games,
gambling, and electronic banking. While some of these electronic retailers
may already have Internet-based services, these typically need to be reauthored for the different systems used by television network operators
(though, as discussed below, there are several standardization efforts under
way). In contrast with the Internet-based services, however, these television
platforms are strictly “walled-garden” environments: The network operator
selects a limited number of electronic merchants that are made available to
subscribers and typically charges an up-front fee for access control (e.g.,
19
authentication) and for billing services as well as a commission on sales.
While the market for ITV is still maturing, the pace of development
has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Growth has been fueled by
decreasing equipment costs (of both network hardware and home

19. For example, BSkyB reportedly takes an eight percent commission on sales of one
of its services. Emma Duncan, At Least Television Works, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 2000, at
27, 30.
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terminals) and related infrastructure investments that facilitate the
provision of ITV services, in particular the slow but steady migration to
21
digital transmission in terrestrial, cable, and satellite television. Some
have argued that such rapid growth makes a case against regulatory action.
On the contrary, we argue that it is precisely in this formative stage of
network development that rules are critical, much like policy intervention
favoring open network access in telecommunications networks starting in
the late 1960s that allowed the Internet revolution to unfold several years
later. Important architectural features of the ITV network will be
established and solidified in this early period. It is precisely during this
formative period of the industry that policymakers have an opportunity to
favor innovation and competition in the next generation of television
services.

IV. POLICY CONCERNS RAISED BY ITV
Opportunities for dominant network operators to foreclose
competition in the adjacent market for ITV services exist with three
network components: the transmission system, the return path, and the
home terminal (typically a digital set-top box). In this Section we examine
these opportunities and discuss the incentives for discriminatory behavior
by vertically integrated network operators. We argue that as a result of
technical, economic, and regulatory factors, a dominant platform for the
delivery of ITV services is likely to emerge in every geographic market (in
the U.S. case, the local cable franchises). Unaffiliated ITV service
providers and third-party programmers may consequently face
discriminatory access to network components as the dominant platform
operator would have incentives to favor its affiliated ITV service, thus
reducing innovation and discouraging entry in this infant market.

A.

Transmission System

In the case of program-related services, the most apparent opportunity
that exists for network operators to discriminate in favor of affiliated ITV
service providers and programmers consists of “stripping” the ITV
enhancements from the video signal of an unaffiliated programmer, thus
blocking access to the enhanced features offered by competitors. Time
20. For example, the cost of video servers, the core component of video-on-demand
systems, has dropped ninety percent over the last ten years. The cost of digital set-top boxes
has also dropped dramatically in recent years following the decline in prices for computer
components. See Ken Kerschbaumer, Interactive Television: Fulfilling the Promise, BROAD.
& CABLE, July 10, 2000, at 22, 23.
21. See Hernan Galperin, Can the US Transition to Digital TV be Fixed?: Some Lessons
from Two European Union Cases, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 3 (2002).
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Warner Cable, for example, has repeatedly blocked subscriber access to
Guide Plus+, a free EPG offered by ITV provider Gemstar that is carried
22
over the Vertical Blanking Interval (“VBI”). By stripping out the data
inserted by Gemstar in the VBI of local television broadcast stations, Time
Warner was favoring a competing EPG offered by its own cable
23
subsidiaries.
It is important to note that in the case of program-related services, the
issue is not of programmers’ access rights to cable distribution per se. Even
when the network operator has agreed (or is forced by statute, as in the case
of local television stations) to carry an unaffiliated programmer, it has the
ability to favor its own related programmer (e.g., AOL/Time Warner’s
Cartoon Network as compared to Disney’s Disney Channel) by stripping
the interactive features of a rival’s video signal (e.g., the ATVEF
“triggers”). Alternatively, the platform operator can slow down the rate of
transmission of the downstream interactive data, thus interfering with the
synchronization between the interactive service and the programming to
which it is related. The ultimate effect is similar: to make an unaffiliated
video signal less compelling as an information/entertainment experience.
In the case of dedicated ITV services, the bundling of transmission
and ITV service presents questions similar to those discussed in the context
of the debate over broadband cable Internet. Nonetheless, in this case the
concerns are exacerbated by the fact that, unlike ISPs, ITV service
providers are faced from the start with the closed network architecture of
the second generation of broadcasting, rather than the end-to-end
architecture of the first-generation Internet. Hence, if a single transmission
network emerges as the only viable alternative to compete in the provision
of ITV services (an assumption we explore infra), the network operator
does not need to re-engineer the network in order to favor its affiliates
because entry will be, from the outset, by invitation only. As the ITC
explains:
The distinctiveness of interactive television services as compared with
the [I]nternet is manifested in the “walled garden” concept, where a
limited number of sites or parts of sites are selected by the interactive
licensee. . . . In this environment an interactive licensee has the
22. The VBI is the interval between television frames in analog broadcasting, which
allows for a limited capacity of data transmission. OWEN, supra note 9, at 103-05.
23. Gemstar Int’l Group, Ltd. and Gemstar Dev. Corp. Pet. for Special Relief,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 21531, para. 28, 25 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
333 (2001). Due to regulatory scrutiny of the AOL/Time Warner merger, Time Warner
Cable has reportedly ceased such practice. Ex Parte Filing of The Walt Disney Company to
the FCC, CS Dkt. No. 00-30, at 28 (July 25, 2000), available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6511458333.
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potential to exercise a degree of pre-selection and control of content
through their contractual relationships with the providers of the walled
garden content. This factor . . . suggests that a somewhat different
24
treatment is needed from that applied to the [I]nternet.

Critics of ex ante regulatory action on ITV nonetheless contend that
network operators are unlikely to have incentives to discriminate against
unaffiliated ITV providers or programmers, and that any rules imposed will
have costly effects on investments and service efficiency:
[I]t is implausible that any local ITV platform could hope to raise entry
barriers by denying access to rival ITV service providers. Because it
could not raise entry barriers, it would have incentives to deny access
if and only if such a denial were efficient: either because the denied
service provider would not efficiently fit the platform or because
vertical integration of ITV platforms and services is more efficient.
Any interference with such decisions would make ITV markets
25
inefficient, with higher costs or lower quality for consumers.

In our opinion, the argument that network operators will lack
incentives to discriminate, and will therefore offer access to as many
programmers and service providers as would “fit the platform” is weak for
a number of reasons. First, while it is clear that a network operator will
want to maximize available content in order to attract new subscribers or to
sell more products to existing subscribers, it is not clear that it will have
incentives to grant users access to competing ITV service providers,
particularly given the existence of close substitutes in the programming
26
market. Further, where there are capacity constraints that prevent carriage
of all possible content, operators naturally will privilege affiliated content.
In addition, the very nature of many interactive services creates further
incentives to discriminate. These new services routinely generate
transactions that bring revenues in addition to basic subscription—for
example, payments to play online games, product or services purchases, or
commissions. Network operators certainly will want to capture some share
of these additional revenues, and therefore will have strong incentives to
favor affiliated providers of such interactive services.
Furthermore, the above argument is based on a static notion of market
efficiency and consumer welfare that overlooks two fundamental goals in
24. Independent Television Commission, supra note 17, at 7.
25. Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services Over
Cable, Comments of National Cable Television Association, CS Dkt. No. 01-7, Attachment
A at 35 (March 19, 2001), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6512562663.
26. See Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services Over
Cable, Declaration of J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, CS Dkt. No. 01-7 (June 8, 2001),
at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6512569104.
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communication policymaking: that of fostering dynamic innovation in
broadcasting services and that of promoting widespread access to
27
information “from diverse and antagonistic sources.” The very existence
of a gatekeeper between ITV services and end users will suffice to
discourage entry by application developers and programmers. The ultimate
result would be an efficient (in static terms) but highly constrained
environment for the conduct of commerce and speech. Finally, the
argument simply contradicts the actual evidence of discriminatory behavior
by cable operators against unaffiliated ITV service providers, which as
discussed infra has been amply documented in the AOL/Time Warner
merger review.

B.

Return Path

ITV is based on the existence of a return path that provides upstream
communication between the home terminal and the service provider. This
return path can potentially take many forms: It may be a standard dial-up
Internet connection (used for example by WebTV), a proprietary version of
a dial-up connection (used by AOLTV), an “out-of-band” reverse data
channel (as used by most cable operators), or even a wireless two-way
28
radio connection (used by Gemstar’s GuidePlus+). For most dedicated
ITV services, the speed and synchronization of the return path with the
video signal do not pose significant market-entry barriers. For programrelated services and dedicated services that do not tolerate latency or
require full-screen video streaming, the availability of a high-speed, highcapacity return path that works in close coordination with the related video
feed is essential to create a compelling ITV experience. In most cases, this
is best achieved through a broadband Internet connection.
As a result, cable is likely to become the dominant platform for ITV
services, at least in the United States, where the cable plant is already
installed and rapidly being upgraded to provide two-way digital services
(we discuss infra the European case where DBS seems to have a firstmover advantage over cable). As the FTC explains:
Cable has distinct advantages over alternative ITV transport and
connection methods. The television signal is already transmitted over
cable, which makes synchronizing viewer interaction with the
programming easier. Neither satellite nor DSL connections can

27. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
28. See generally Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive TV Servs. Over
Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, para. 21 (2001) [hereinafter Nondiscrimination
in the Distribution of ITV Servs. Notice of Inquiry] (describing the various methods of
distribution of video access signals).
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integrate the cable video programming and the interactive functionality
29
as smoothly as cable.

Cable networks also provide extensive transmission capacity in both
directions (downstream and upstream), a critical factor for the new
generation of broadcasting services. Furthermore, operators have already
made substantial investments in upgrading facilities to offer digital
television packages and broadband cable Internet, upon which ITV services
30
could be piggybacked. As the FCC concludes, “[o]ur understanding of the
current state of technology suggests that the cable platform is likely to be
the best suited for delivering ITV services, particularly high speed services,
31
for at least the near term.”
The lack of a credible competitor to discipline cable operators opens
several avenues for discriminatory behavior in favor of affiliated
programmers and ITV service providers. Cable operators can simply refuse
to provide a return path to third parties. In fact, during the AOL/Time
Warner merger review the FCC received several complaints from
unaffiliated programmers about Time Warner Cable’s refusal to provide
32
guarantees in terms of nondiscriminatory use of the return path. The
network operator may also degrade the quality of the return path (in terms
of speed or reliability) offered to third parties. In addition, it could seek
charges for t-commerce transactions originated through its platform. This
would be similar to an ISP seeking compensation from electronic retailers
such as Amazon.com for every item sold to its subscribers. Rather than
simply enabling transactions under the end-to-end principle, the transport
33
operator would erect a tollgate between buyers and sellers. Lastly,
valuable customer data can be obtained from the return path even when the
platform operator is not a party of the commercial transaction taking place.
This has raised concerns not only from third-party programmers and ITV
29. Compl., America Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-3989 at 4
(2000) [hereinafter FTC Complaint].
30. The National Cable & Telecommunications Association estimates that by the end of
2001, seventy percent of households were passed by cable broadband. CABLE & TELECOMM.
INDUS., Mid-Year Overview 2, chart 2 (2002), at http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/
Mid’02Overview.pdf.
31. Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of ITV Servs. Notice of Inquiry, supra note
28, para. 21.
32. See Application of America Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc. for Transfers of
Control, Ex Parte Submission of The Walt Disney Company, CS Dkt. No. 00-30 (filed Oct.
25, 2000), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&
id_document=6511960660.
33. As Time Warner Cable executive Kevin Leddy stated, “If a programmer wants to
offer its advertisers the ability to have two-way communication with viewers, the cable
operator has to be part of that.” Saul Hansell, AOL-Time Warner Rivals Preparing for
Interactive TV Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at C1.
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service providers, but also from consumer groups alarmed about viewers
having little control over how the return-path data will be compiled
34
and used.

C.

Home Terminal

The third necessary component of an ITV system is the home
terminal or digital set-top box. As the number and complexity of ITV
services increases, so will the processing and storage capacity of the home
terminal in order to perform the different tasks. In essence, a digital set-top
box is similar to a stripped-down personal computer. There are at least two
components within the digital set-top box that, absent regulatory safeguards
or open industry standards, present opportunities for discriminatory
behavior by dominant platform operators. The first is the Application
Program Interface (“API”), which is the software layer between the
operating system and the different applications running on the terminal.
Unlike the more mature personal computer industry, there is no de facto
industry standard for set-top box APIs. If such a standard were to develop
in the future, and if its technical specifications were available to application
developers on nondiscriminatory terms, the competitive concerns
associated with the API would be mitigated. There are a number of industry
consortia working to create an open platform for ITV. Among them are
35
OpenCable’s OpenCable Applications Platform (“OCAP”), the Digital
Video Broadcasting (“DVB”) group’s Multimedia Home Platform
36
(“MHP”), and even a Linux-based platform sponsored by the TV Linux
37
Alliance. For the foreseeable future, however, proprietary (i.e., noninteroperable) APIs will be deployed by network operators, forcing
developers to rewrite ITV applications for several different environments.
In order to enter the market, an ITV service provider (assuming it has
secured both downstream and upstream carriage) faces two options: it can
either contract with the dominant platform operator to gain access to the

34. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, TV THAT WATCHES YOU: THE PRYING
EYES OF INTERACTIVE TELEVISION (June 2001), at http://www.democraticmedia.org/
privacyreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
35. OpenCable is an initiative of CableLabs, a Research and Development consortium
formed by U.S. cable operators. See generally http://www.cablelabs.com (last visited Oct. 7,
2002).
36. The DVB group is an European consortium formed by equipment manufacturers,
broadcasters, content producers, software developers, and representatives of national
regulatory bodies. See generally http://www.dvb.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
37. The TV Linux Alliance is a U.S.-based consortium of technology suppliers to cable,
satellite and telecommunications network operators. See generally http://www.
tvlinuxalliance.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
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installed base of terminals, or it can deploy a stand-alone box and bypass
the proprietary terminal components altogether. The second option, while
theoretically possible, is nonetheless uneconomical for most potential
entrants. It is highly unlikely that users will be willing to buy a new box for
every new ITV application. Who would be willing to buy a separate
personal computer for every new application? The failure of stand-alone
boxes marketed by companies like TiVo (which allowed digital video
recording) and WebTV (despite heavy marketing spending by its parent
Microsoft) has shown that consumers prefer a single box that integrates
38
traditional video programming with new services. Furthermore, the
evidence from the introduction of DBS, wireless telephony, and digital
television shows that heavy terminal subsidies are necessary. Thus, as a
European competition official said, “[T]he scale of investment required
means that the new entrants’ most realistic option is to provide a . . .
39
service using the set top boxes which already exist.”
Access to the API specifications and related facilities (authoring tools,
authorization keys, memory control, etc.) is therefore critical for potential
entrants in the ITV services market. This creates several opportunities for
strategic behavior by dominant network operators such as refusing to
provide authoring tools, discriminatory access pricing, discriminatory
allocation of set-top boxes facilities (e.g., set-top box memory for caching),
and bundling of API access with other services (e.g., conditional access or
subscription management). That fair competition in ITV services requires
either standardization or nondiscriminatory licensing of API specifications
has been long recognized by European regulators. Accordingly, the new
EU communications regulatory package contains several measures to
promote API standardization in member-states, and allows national
regulatory authorities to take steps to ensure nondiscriminatory access to
40
API specifications and related facilities.
The second component that raises policy concerns is the EPG, a
navigation tool that allows users to browse and select television channels
38. See generally CONSUMER ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL AMERICA 2002, THE
U.S. CONSUMER ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY TODAY, at http://www.ce.org/publications/books_
references/digital_america/default.asp. In fact, Personal Video Recorders (“PVRs”) by TiVo
and others are now being embedded into cable and satellite receivers. See generally Jennifer
8. Lee, In the US, Interactive TV Still Awaits an Audience, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at
C1.
39. Linsey Mc Callum, EC Competition Law and Digital Pay TV, 1 COMPETITION
POL’Y NEWSL. 4, 11 (1999).
40. See, e.g., Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks
and Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 7, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00070020.pdf.
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and services. With the manifold increase in the number of channels and
applications made possible by the transition to digital television, the EPG is
expected to become to the broadcasting industry what Web portals have
become to the Internet: powerful tools to direct traffic and obtain
advertising revenues. From a regulatory standpoint, the main concern is
that dominant platform operators do not use the EPG to leverage their
power onto the market for content and ITV services. As European
regulators explain:
Issues of ensuring listing of third-party services or programming, and
the quality of such listings, will be of critical importance. Exclusive
arrangements tying particular EPGs to particular service bundles may
become a problem requiring regulatory intervention to ensure third41
party access on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms.

U.S. regulators increasingly have grown concerned about issues of
first-screen and presentation bias in EPGs, although regulatory action so far
has been limited. For example, a few nondiscriminatory provisions were
42
adopted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the case of EPG
43
services offered by Open Video Systems operators, as well as in the
44
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 in the case of EPGs
offered by DBS operators. Yet, these rules do not extend to cable systems.
In 1999, the merger of the two major EPG providers (Gemstar and TV
Guide) was the subject of an antitrust investigation by the U.S. Department
45
of Justice, which ultimately declined to challenge the deal. In Europe, by
contrast, regulators have taken a more active role in regulating EPG
services, either to protect third-party programmers and service providers or
to favor publicly funded broadcasters. In the UK, for example, the Office of
Telecommunications (“OFTEL”) has interpreted EPGs as covered by the
46
nondiscriminatory rules for telecommunications access services, while the
ITC has adopted a “code of conduct” for EPG providers that, among other
things, mandates that the visual interface grants public service channels
47
“due prominence.” As discussed infra in the British Interactive

41. Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and
Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation, Commission of Eur.
Cmtys., COM(97)623EC 24-25 (Mar. 12, 1997) (citations omitted).
42. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 573(b) (2000).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2000).
45. Christopher Grimes, Gemstar Closes TV Guide Deal, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at
34, available at LEXIS, News Library, Financial Times.
46. See OFFICE OF TELECOMM., DIGITAL TV AND INTERACTIVE SERVICES: ENSURING
ACCESS ON FAIR, REASONABLE, AND NONDISCRIMINATORY TERMS (1998), at
http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/1995_98/broadcasting/dig398.htm. (Mar. 1998).
47. See generally INDEPENDENT TV COMMISSION, CODE OF CONDUCT ON ELECTRONIC
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Broadcasting (“BiB”) case, European competition authorities also have
acted against exclusivity arrangements between EPG providers and
dominant network operators.

V. THE CASES: THE AOL/TIME WARNER MERGER AND
BRITISH INTERACTIVE BROADCASTING
The debate about the proper tools and scope of regulatory action visà-vis ITV services already has surfaced in a number of cases. In this
Section we analyze two of the most prominent ones: the AOL/Time Warner
merger and the BiB case. BiB was a joint venture for the launch of ITV
services in the UK created by BSkyB, British Telecommunications (“BT”),
Midland Bank (part of the HSBC banking group), and Matsushita, the
48
Japanese consumer electronics giant. We contrast the approach taken by
American and European regulators with the issues raised by these cases and
analyze the implications of the regulatory obligations imposed in each case.

A.

The AOL/Time Warner Merger

The January 2000 announcement of the merger between AOL and
Time Warner triggered close scrutiny by federal regulators. The
investigation conducted by the FTC concluded that the combination of
AOL’s Internet properties with Time Warner’s cable holdings and content
assets had anticompetitive effects in three distinct markets: broadband
Internet access service, broadband Internet transport service, and ITV
49
services. While most of the debate about the competitive effect of the
merger focused on the first two issues, the FTC findings brought attention
to the architecture of next-generation broadcasting networks. The main
50
concerns that were raised related to AOLTV, AOL’s ITV product. The
existing generation of the AOLTV service consisted of a stand-alone settop box that connected to a cable or DBS receiver and blends this video
programming with interactive content transmitted via a narrow-band dial51
up modem. While regulators raised few concerns about this service,
AOL’s plan to upgrade it by embedding AOLTV within Time Warner
cable boxes and utilizing the broadband Internet platform of the cable
PROGRAMME GUIDES (1997), at http://www.itc.org.uk/itc_publications/codes_guidance/
electronic_programme_guide/epg_code.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
48. David Teather, Closing time: BskyB is set to close Open, the interactive TV firm, in
order to boost its own business. But has the market lost its taste for TV shopping?, THE
GUARDIAN, May 7, 2001, at 30.
49. America Online, Inc. and Time Warner Inc., Complaint, FTC Dkt. No. C-3989, at
3-4 (2000).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
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operator troubled competition authorities. As the FTC explained:
AOL recently launched AOL TV [sic], a first generation ITV service,
and is well positioned to become the leading ITV provider. Local cable
companies will play the key role in enabling the delivery of ITV
services. After the merger, AOL/Time Warner will have incentives to
prevent or deter rival ITV providers from competing with AOL’s ITV
service. Thus, the merger could enable AOL to exercise unilateral
market power in the market for ITV services in Time Warner cable
areas, which also affects the ability of ITV providers to compete
52
nationally.

Despite the strong wording of these findings, the FTC ultimately
imposed rather weak remedies related to ITV. The consent decree that
authorized the merger simply prohibits AOL/Time Warner from interfering
with its subscribers’ ability to use the interactive signals or “triggers”
provided by programmers that it has agreed (or is forced by statute) to
53
carry. In essence, the FTC order only addressed one of the possible
anticompetitive strategies discussed infra, that of network operators
“stripping” the signals of unaffiliated programmers from its interactive
content. Other discriminatory practices related to downstream transmission,
upstream transmission (the return path), and the home terminal were left
unaddressed.
The FCC investigation concurred with the findings of the FTC
review:
AOL Time Warner would have the potential ability to use its combined
control of cable system facilities, video programming and the AOLTV
service to discriminate against unaffiliated video programming
networks in the provision of ITV services. We also find that AOL
Time Warner may have incentives to engage in such discriminatory
54
behavior.

The FCC analysis is broader in scope and acknowledges that the
anticompetitive strategies available to AOL/Time Warner go beyond the
“stripping” of interactive content of unaffiliated programmers. It also notes
that the Memorandum of Understanding, by which the merger parties
committed to provide customers with a choice of ISPs, does not obligate
the company to provide access for ITV uses. Nonetheless, the FCC
declined to impose additional conditions on the parties pending further
52. America Online, Inc. and Time Warner Inc., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment, FTC Dkt. No. C-3989, at 2 (2000).
53. America Online, Inc. and Time Warner Inc., Decision and Order, FTC Dkt. No. C3989, at 11 (2000).
54. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, para. 217, 23
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 157 (2001).
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examination of market developments and the potential incentives for
discriminatory behavior by AOL/Time Warner. In the Commission’s
analysis, the FTC’s prohibition on “stripping,” coupled with the conditions
relating to the availability of multiple ISPs, suffice to protect competition,
at least during the initial stages of the ITV market. In the words of thenCommissioner (and now Chairman) Michael Powell, “[A]lthough it is
surely possible to hypothesize public interest harms flowing from a cable
operator’s control of assets like those at issue in this merger, the [ITV]
market is too immature to conclude with any confidence whether such
harms are sufficiently probable to warrant direct government
55
intervention.”

B.

The British Interactive Broadcasting Case

BiB operates one of the largest and most advanced ITV services
worldwide. It is available to the more than six million subscribers of
BSkyB’s digital television satellite service, offering a variety of dedicated
services such as e-mail, electronic banking, games, and gambling, as well
56
as program-related services tied to channels offered by BSkyB. It
provides ITV services in the UK by means of satellite broadcasting (leased
from BSkyB, with BT responsible for the uplink) in combination with a
narrow-band return path through a standard telephone line. The terminal
equipment required to use BiB services is embedded in the BSkyB digital
television set-top box, which BiB partly subsidizes (this includes a
57
proprietary API developed by OpenTV and BSkyB’s EPG). Revenues
come from end-users, from retailers and from ITV service providers that
58
BiB carries on its platform.
European competition authorities raised two main concerns about
BiB. First, that the company would use its control of the set-top box
software components to foreclose competition in ITV services, denying
third parties access to the boxes being deployed. Second, that BiB would
enhance the already-dominant position of BSkyB and BT in the markets for

55. Press Statement, FCC Commissioner Michael Powell, Approval of AOL-Time
Warner Merger (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/
Statements/2001/stmkp0101.html.
56. BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GROUP PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS (2002),
available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/lse/bsy.uk/reports/BSKYB_ar_2002.
pdf.
57. Notice published under Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 Concerning an
Application for Negative Clearance or an Individual Decision to Grant an Exemption
Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/36.539—BiB), 1998 O.J. (C 322) 6
(Oct. 21, 1998).
58. Duncan, supra note 19, at 27, 30.
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pay television and telecommunications local loop respectively. In October
1998, the European Commission approved the joint venture subject to a
59
number of conditions. In contrast with the AOL/Time Warner case, the
main regulatory concern was to ensure that “third parties, whether
operators of digital television or digital interactive TV services, have fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory access to all proprietary components of
60
the digital set top box which BiB will subsidise.” The difference in focus
is due to the fact that while cable operators effectively control the
transmission infrastructure, satellite television operators lease capacity
61
from (often unaffiliated) satellite carriers. Market power, therefore, stems
not from control over transmission infrastructure but rather from firstmover advantages and switching costs associated with proprietary home
62
terminals.
One of the conditions imposed concerned the recovery of the set-top
box subsidy. The Commission forced BiB to establish a separate company
to manage the subsidy payments in order to ensure that the recovery is
evenly distributed among service operators and broadcasters, whether
affiliated with BiB and its partners or not. It also demanded that the subsidy
63
was not linked to a subscription to BSkyB’s pay-television service.
Another condition related to the terms of access to the home terminal
components. BiB agreed to provide, upon request, the API specifications
and other proprietary technical information to third parties. The
Commission also forced BiB to end its exclusivity agreement with BSkyB,
whereby BiB would be the only available ITV service on BSkyB’s EPG. In
addition, the Commission also imposed several obligations on the joint
venture partners. BSkyB agreed to offer access services to programmers
and ITV service providers (including BiB) on fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory terms regulated by OFTEL. It also agreed to supply,
upon request, a “clean feed” (i.e., stripped of interactive applications) of its
film and sports channels to other MVPDs (e.g., cable operators) in order to
59. Mc Callum, supra note 39, at 6.
60. Id. at 13.
61. In the case of BSkyB, it leases satellite capacity from Société Européenne des
Satellites. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, DIRECTOR GENERAL’S REVIEW OF BSKYB IN THE
WHOLESALE PAY TV MARKET (1996) at http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/eupiymw
5hitxeuawrxfukg44iowwyubhp33q4nimzdezdp33wgfi2kg2vigxp6r5ma55pmtejiigl7a3fottls
ocjwb/oft179.pdf.
62. See Martin Cave, Regulating Digital TV in a Convergent World, 21 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 575 (1997).
63. Notice published under Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 Concerning an
Application for Negative Clearance or an Individual Decision to Grant an Exemption
Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/36.539—BiB), 1998 O.J. (C 322) 6
(Oct. 21, 1998).
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prevent bundling strategies that would favor BiB. Finally, BT agreed to
64
divest from its existing cable interests.
The conditions imposed by the EC on the BiB venture are consistent
with the established doctrine among community competition authorities
that ex post rules are insufficient to remedy the problem of access to
telecommunications facilities, and thus need to be supplemented by ex
65
ante, sector-specific obligations. This doctrine has been implemented
through a series of Council Directives under the so-called Open Network
Provision (“ONP”) framework, which imposes on telecommunications
operators having significant market power certain nondiscriminatory
obligations that go beyond those that would normally apply under general
66
competition law. It is interesting to note that a few weeks before the BiB
decision, the Commission adopted the Access Notice that explicitly stated
that the ONP framework extends not only to telecommunications facilities,
67
but also to “access issues in digital communications sectors generally.”
This doctrine was crystallized in the recently passed Access Directive,
which specifies the instruments for extending interconnection obligations
68
to providers of ITV facilities such as the API and the EPG. Through these
efforts, EU policymakers are progressively bringing about a policy
convergence that mirrors technological convergence, aiming for
technology-independent rules that govern communication activities
according to general principles.

64. Id.
65. See HERBERT UNGERER, ACCESS ISSUES UNDER EU REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
LAW: THE CASE OF TELECOMMUNICATION AND INTERNET MARKETS (Harvard Univ.
Weatherhead Ctr. for Int’l Affairs, Working Paper No. 00-05, 2000).
66. See generally Council Directive of 28 June 1990, Establishment of the Internal
Market for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of Open Network
Provision, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1 (discussing the general framework provided by the ONP
Framework Directive); see also Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 Application of
Open Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 2; Council Recommendation
92/382 of 5 June 1992, Harmonized Provision of a Minimum Set of Packet-Switched Data
Services (PSDS) in Accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J.
(L 200) 1; Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Dec.
1995, Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony, 1995 O.J. (L
321) 6.
67. Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector—Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles, Notice, 1998
O.J. (C 265) 2, 3.
68. European Council Directive of 7 March 2002, Access to, and Interconnection of,
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities (Access Directive), 2002
O.J. (L 108) 7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the AOL/Time Warner merger, the debate about
open cable access has faded considerably. The more general problem of
nondiscriminatory access to the basic layers of communications
69
70
infrastructure, whether cable lines, the local loop, the emerging wireless
71
72
data networks, or the digital television user terminal, is arguably the
crucial issue for industry and regulators in the post-convergence era. In this
Article we examined how this problem unfolded in the migration to the
third generation of broadcasting services, that of ITV. We argued that
absent regulatory safeguards that provide for nondiscriminatory access to
several network components (including digital set-top box components),
dominant platform operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery
infrastructure into market power over ITV services and content, foreclosing
competition and discouraging third parties and users from experimenting
with yet-unimagined ways to use television.
In the case of ITV, the question of open access is not about extending
existing regulatory principles to the new generation of technologies.
Rather, it is about seizing the opportunities offered by these new
technologies to better serve our policy goals. Broadcasting regulation has
traditionally taken distribution scarcities and closed network architecture as
a fact of life dictated by the available technology, thus relying on
ownership caps, content obligations, must-carry rules, and other
instruments of structural regulation to attain its goals. It is now widely
acknowledged that this approach has not only largely failed on its own
merits, but also is inadequate for a post-convergence world. The third
generation of television calls for shifting the focus of regulatory action
from government “tinkering with the configuration of a mass media
73
market” to rules that ensure nondiscriminatory access to the capacity to

69. See generally Mark Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925
(2001) (arguing that cable modem services threaten the open architecture of the Internet, and
thus its growth and innovation).
70. See generally UNGERER, supra note 65 (outlining the ONP doctrine used to
introduce competition in the European telecommunications sector).
71. See generally Eli M. Noam, The Next Frontier for Openness: Wireless
Communications (Sept. 25, 2001) (paper for the 2001 Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference, Alexandria, Va.), at http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0109/0109102.pdf.
72. See generally Galperin, supra note 21 (discussing how problems of access to the
terminal equipment threaten competition in digital television services).
73. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562
(2000).
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experiment with and provide information, entertainment, and transaction
services over broadcasting networks.
American regulators prefer to wait and observe the unfolding of the
new media. They have been content so far with rather toothless safeguards
to prevent discriminatory behavior by incumbent network operators in the
ITV market. Furthermore, these rules are dispersed across statutes
addressing different platforms, thus distorting market competition.
European authorities, by contrast, are in the process of fashioning a
comprehensive framework that addresses problems of access and
interconnection across electronic communications networks. This
framework does not impose specific remedies but rather lays out general
principles to tackle problems as they arise. By addressing access in a
piecemeal, ad hoc fashion, U.S. policymakers may undermine the very
basis of the unprecedented innovation in communications technology of the
last decade, and, in the case of television, forgo the possibility to revamp a
failed regulatory regime. As media converge, it is becoming clear that
access will be a generic issue, relevant to wireless, cable, broadcast,
telephone, and the Internet alike. Whether one agrees with specific EU
rules or not, there is a compelling logic in the European endeavor to revert
to basic principles and to apply them uniformly across
communication media.

